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Development Oriented Tax Policy 
 
Joseph E. Stiglitz1 
 
No public policy issue is of more importance that the structure and level of taxes.  Tax 
reform has led governments to fall.  Proposals to extend the V.A.T. or increase its rates 
have been a source of political agitation in Ecuador and Mexico.  In many less developed 
countries, a shortage of funds impedes development efforts, and yet attempts to expand 
taxation not only meet enormous political resistance, but also often turn out to be futile.  
Simplistic recommendations to increase the power of the tax police often backfire—
generating substantially more revenue for the tax collectors, but not much extra revenue 
for the public fisc.   
 
Part of the problem surely lies in the fact that those providing advice on taxation to 
developing countries are neither sensitive to the differences in economic and political 
structures between developed and less developed countries, to the administrative 
difficulties faced by developing countries, or to the differences in objectives.  To take but 
two examples:  Standard textbook expositions of the objectives of tax policy for 
developed countries, for instance, emphasize efficiency, and more recent expositions 
discuss problems of tax avoidance and evasion, but seldom make note of corruption.  But 
corruption has increasingly come to be recognized as one of the major challenges facing 
developing countries.  Designing institutions and policies, including tax structures, which 
reduce the scope for corruption—what I call corruption resistant tax structures—should 
thus be a central concern in tax design.  Yet while outside advisers often deliver 
moralistic lectures on the need to improve tax administration and reduce corruption, they 
seldom address corruption as part of tax design.  This provides an example where 
differences in the structure of the economy (where that term embraces institutional 
capacities—the ability to control corruption) dictates a difference in tax policy. 
 
Objectives too differ.  It is at least arguable that tax policy should be used to promote 
development, or at least be designed not to impede development.  And while both 
developing and developed countries may see redistribution as one of the objectives of tax 
policy, the set of instruments available for redistribution may be more restricted in 
developing countries, which in turn may impact tax design.  For instance, a by now well 
known result holds that with an optimal income tax, there is (in a central case) no need to 
rely on commodity taxation for redistribution2; since a large fraction of value added is 
generated in a relatively few large enterprises, and the V.A.T. is collected from almost all 
sectors, the V .A.T. is an efficient tax.   It can be combined with a progressive income tax 
as part of an “optimal” tax structure.  By contrast, in most developing countries, the 
V.A.T. is typically collected from only a fraction (often under 50%) of the economy.  It is 
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effectively a tax on the organized sector of the economy—it is a tax on development.  
Not only is it accordingly potentially highly distortionary, but since most developing 
countries have limited income taxes, heavy reliance on the V.A.T. results in a regressive 
(or at least not highly progressive) income tax structure.  While as I noted, a central 
objective of tax policy in developing countries should be promoting development, yet the 
V.A.T. arguably does just the opposite, since it is,  in many countries, simply a tax on the 
“organized” sectors of the economy.   
 
Consider, as a third example, the use of corrective taxation—taxes designed to “correct” 
market failures, such as those associated with externalities.  Discussions of corrective 
taxation have, for the most part, been relegated to environmental issues.  Yet in 
developing countries, market failures (including imperfections of information and 
incomplete markets) provide a much wider scope for corrective taxation. Recent work on 
imperfections of information and incompleteness of markets has emphasized how a 
variety of actions/choices give rise to externality-like effects.3  Many of the endogenous 
growth models4 recognize the existence of returns to scale and externalities.  Yet, 
remarkably, discussions of tax policy have ignored the role that corrective taxes might 
play, generating revenues as they improve economic efficiency.5 A case in point is short 
term capital flows, which have been shown to be a major source of instability in 
developing countries.  Chilean style taxes on capital inflows can thus play an important 
role in stabilizing the economy, thereby promoting economic growth, at the same time 
that they raise revenue.6 
 
  Earlier, I noted the central importance in developing countries of designing corruption 
resistant tax   One of the virtues of the V.A.T. in more developed country is the self-
enforcing nature; taxes paid at a lower level are refundable at the next level, and so, it 
would seem, the downstream firm has an incentive to “report” purchases, which are, of 
course, sales to others.  But if the upstream firm’s income is not easily observable, then it 
may be difficult to collect the V.A.T. from him; and he then has an incentive to engage in 
a “deal” with his supplier, with both agreeing not to report.  The so-called self-enforcing 
property of the V.A.T. can easily unravel—and it often does in developing countries.     
 
Developed and less developed countries typically provide rebates on exports under the 
V.A.T.  This is supposed to ensure that the tax is a tax on domestic consumption, not on 
domestic production.  But country after country has encountered problems in their rebate 
system.  Sometimes, there are long lags in providing the rebates; for firms facing a 
shortage of capital this can be crippling.  But even worse, the rebates have become a 
source of corruption, as fake documents have been used to get the government to provide 
large checks to corporations.  (Kenya provided the most infamous example.) 
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Information is at the core of what are “admissible” tax structures:  one can only tax what 
one can observe.7  The reason that optimal lump sum redistributive taxes are not feasible 
is that the government cannot directly observe individuals’ ability; it can only observe 
surrogates, like income, and the use of such surrogates gives rise to distortions.  In the 
informal sector, market transactions are typically not easily observable by the 
government.   
 
New technologies and organizational structures have changed the calculus of 
observability.  Large organizations need to record many transactions—people are 
“replaceable parts”—leaving a trail of observability for tax authorities.  Modern 
computers have made information “control” easier, and at the same time have eased the 
burden of the tax collector.  It is difficult for firms to maintain two sets of books (and, 
outside of certain limited areas, illegal), so that information provided to investors—
intended to increase share market value—has to jibe with information provided to the tax 
collector, designed to minimize tax burden, and that in turn has to jibe with the true 
information required for managing the organization.8  The convenience of credit cards 
has provided an audit trail that makes collecting taxes from retailers far easier, and the 
use of bank accounts has become so pervasive that there is automatic suspicion of 
someone who relies only or largely on cash.   
 
Yet, these changes have largely bypassed developing countries.  Financial depth is 
limited, and credit card usage is the exception.  It is not just that many individuals might 
hide income from the tax collector; individuals do not know their income.  They may 
know their savings—how much they have to left over at the end of the year—but have no 
records that show how much of the revenues are spent on consumption, how much to 
purchase inputs into production.  For an American or European firm, there would be a 
great burden not to have such information; for the typical African barely literate farmer, 
there would be an enormous burden to maintain such records. 
 
One of the reasons that in earlier stages of development, considerable reliance was placed 
on tariffs is that imports often have to go through a limited number of ports (the cost of 
not going through such ports, of smuggling, can often be quite  high.)  That made it easy 
to monitor—and that in turn made it easier to tax.  Of course, industrial tariffs 
represented quintessentially a development oriented tax structure, as explicitly recognized 
in the heated debates surrounding those tariffs in nineteenth century America. 
 
By the same token, until quite recently, even in advanced industrial countries like the 
United States, tax avoidance9 among self-employed was rampant (and even today, 
aggregate reported incomes of partnerships in some recent years in the U.S. is negative, 
though that has more to taking advantage of certain tax loopholes than to non-reporting) 
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In developing countries, small businesses are the dominant form of economic 
organization.  Why should we expect that they have greater success in tax collection from 
small businesses than does the United States or other advanced industrial countries?  
 
Thus, not only is information at the root of admissible tax structures, information is at the 
root of problems of enforcement, including the related issues of corruption.  If there were 
perfect information, corruption would be no problem.  It would be known who was 
bribing the tax official, and it would presumably be relatively easy to control.  Corruption 
is a problem because it is so hard to observe.  Understanding the limitations on available 
information is at the core of the design of corruption resistant tax structures.   
 
Many developing countries face a fine balance:  because the value of encoded 
information of the kind that can be used by tax authorities may be less, sometimes far 
less, than in the advanced industrial countries, basing such taxes on this information (e.g. 
information contained in bank accounts) is more likely to destroy the information—the 
tax authorities get no more revenue, but economic efficiency is impeded.  It is noteworthy 
that  China and Korea government deliberately decided to foreswear the use of such 
information, by allowing no-name bank accounts; this allowed proportional taxation of 
savings, but made it impossible for the government to use banking information for more 
general tax purposes, e.g. for the imposition of progressive taxation.   
 
6 
I. The VAT as distortionary taxation 
 
As noted earlier, advocates of the VAT argue both for its efficiency and its ease of 
administration.  It is efficient because it is comprehensive.  These advantages, it is 
contended, more than offset a major disadvantage, its lack of progressivity.  The question 
is, is it efficient?   
 
Economists have long recognized that any market taxation encourages non-market 
production, and that this can constitute a significant distortion.  For instance, whether a 
family decides to buy a dishwasher to wash dishes (entailing a market transaction) can be 
affected by the tax rate.  “Labor” inside the family (washing dishes) is not taxed; labor in 
the market (working to buy a dishwasher) is taxed.  The high elasticity of labor supply 
associated with secondary workers may reflect the fact that, to some extent, the 
secondary worker is simply buying goods which are a substitute for the services that the 
secondary worker would otherwise provide at home.  As a result of the high elasticity, 
taxes on wages of secondary workers are highly distortionary. 
 
Similar issues arise in developing countries—except is not only labor within the 
household which escapes taxation, but work in the informal sector, which typically 
cannot easily be monitored, or monitored at all.  Accordingly, a VAT shifts resources 
away from the formal sector into the informal sector, lowering GDP.   
 
The question naturally arises, is there an alternative, less distortionary tax structure?  The 
answer is yes, and Emram and Stiglitz provide a more complete analysis.  But the 
following discussion provides a heuristic.  Assume there exists an imported intermediate 
input, used both in the formal and the informal sector.  While we cannot monitor the 
output of the informal sector, and therefore cannot tax it directly, we may be able to tax it 
indirectly, by taxing the usage of the imported intermediate good.  A standard result of 
optimal tax theory—when all outputs can be taxed—is that one should not tax 
intermediate inputs, including imported inputs.13  But as Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1971, 
1973, 1974] showed, in the more reasonable case where not all outputs can be taxed, it 
may be desirable to tax intermediate inputs.  Assume, at the extreme case, that a unit of 
output requires a unit of this imported intermediate input.  In that case, a tax on the 
intermediate input is equivalent to a tax on the output—in both the formal and the 
informal sector.  The tax is completely non-distortionary.  Converting this tax on imports 
into a value added tax introduces a distortion.  For then, the formal sector faces a tax on 
its total value added, while the informal sector faces a tax only on its intermediate input  
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More generally, of course, taxing the intermediate input does introduce a distortion—
there is a substitution away from the use of this intermediate input (and towards others, in 
the simplest case, labor).  But introducing the tax on the intermediate input into a 
situation where there is only a V.A.T. tax (collected only from the formal sector) always 
increases output, since the deadweight loss of the distortion increases with the square of 
the tax.  In short, it is never optimal to rely on a value added tax.  See Appendix A. 
 
This is one example in which tax policy for developing countries differs from that in 
developed countries.  Another example is provided by Ramsey’s classic result in 
optimal tax theory, suggesting that taxes should be levied at a rate inversely 
proportional to the elasticity of demand.  Atkinson and Stiglitz [1976] showed that  
Ramsey’s result depended on the absence of an optimal redistributive income tax, and 
Stiglitz [2008] showed that even with a simple linear income tax, the benefits of 
Ramsey taxation were very limited.  The conclusion was that Ramsey’s analysis was 
of limited relevance to developed countries.  But in developing countries, income 
taxation is very limited; Ramsey’s analysis is relevant for developing countries.  
Again, this goes against the spirit of the V.A.T., which suggests that one should not 
have differential taxation on different commodities.    
 
The essential point of the Atkinson-Stiglitz analysis is that each tax needs to be viewed as 
part of overall tax structure, and in particular, in light of what other taxes can be imposed.  
That, in turn, depends on what is observable.  For instance, it is difficult to observe hours 
worked, which limits the use of an optimal wage tax—which might be better, in some 
respects, than an optimal income tax.  It is difficult to observe consumption of any 
individual of particular commodities, and this limits ability to use commodity specific 
non-linear consumption taxes.  (Electricity is an exception, and we do use non-linear 
taxes there.)   
 
Much of the advocacy of the V.A.T. is based on pre-Ramsey reasoning—uniform taxes 
are less distortionary than differentiated taxes.  Pre-Ramsey reasoning turned out to be 
approximately correct, for advanced industrial countries, for reasons that have little to do 
with the simplistic analyses employed by the advocates of V.A.T.  But it is wrong in the 
context of developing countries. 
 
 
How the V.A.T. may impede growth 
 
The previous section showed how the V.A.T. lowers national income.  It may also 
lower growth, of particular concern to developing countries.   
 
To see this, assume that the rate of productivity growth is higher in the formal sector.  
The simple case is that where there is no productivity growth in the rural (informal) 
sector.  Assume Qu = F(λLu), where Qu is output in the formal sector, Lu is labor 
input, and λ is the productivity measure.  Then the rate of increase in national output  
can be written gQ = gλ  (sm), where s is share of formal sector in national output, gλ is 
the rate of increase in λ, and  m ≡ F’λLu /F (the share of labor in the formal sector.  It 
8 
is immediate that the larger m, the higher the rate of growth of national output, 
provided that as labor shifts into the formal sector, the share of labor does not 
decrease too much.  The effect is even stronger if we introduce learning by doing.  
With learning by doing, gλ = ξ (Lu), ξ’ > 0, so that the larger the size of the formal 
sector, the faster the rate of growth of productivity.15 
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III.  How the V.A.T. may result in increased unemployment16 
 
Typically, the incidence of alternative taxes in analyzed within simple, competitive 
equilibrium models of the economy.  While it is widely recognized that market 
economies differ in important ways from the competitive ideal, there is no widely 
accepted alternative model, and incidence analysis in models of the economy with 
oligopoly, incomplete markets, monopolistic competition, and imperfect information 
is sufficiently complicated that there has been a strong preference within the 
economics profession for being precisely and simply wrong rather than imprecisely 
and “complexly” correct.  But developing countries are typically developing not just 
because they have few resources; markets, information, and institutions are often 
much less perfect.  The imperfections cannot, or at least should not, be ignored.   
 
Many developing countries are characterized by high levels of urban unemployment, 
itself associated with efficiency wages and costly migration.17  A V.A.T. imposed 
only on the urban sector (or collected more extensively in the urban sector than in the 
rural) effectively is a tax on urban wages. 
 
In standard migration equilibrium model with efficiency wage, labor productivity is 
higher in urban than in rural sector.  Hence V.A.T. lowers overall output as labor is 
induced to move to low productivity sector.  If there is diminishing returns in rural 
sector, V.A.T. leads to lower wages in the rural sector.  But firms in the urban sector 
will then not have to pay workers as much to induce them to work hard.  The 
equilibrium will entail not just lower urban wages, but also higher unemployment.  
Thus, once again, the V.A.T. has both adverse efficiency and distributional 
consequences.   
 
Appendix 2 provides a formal model showing this, and demonstrates that there are 
alternative tax frameworks without these adverse effects.  
 
III. Concluding remarks on the V.A.T.   
 
The usual argument for the V.A. T. is that the V.A.T. is not progressive, but it is efficient.  
Government should resort to other instruments for dealing with distribution 
But for developing countries, the V.A.T. is not an efficient tax; it can, furthermore, lower 
growth and increase unemployment.  But given the absence of other progressive taxes, 
the lack of progressivity of the V.A.T.. is of particular concern.   
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Our analysis shows not only that a V.A.T. is not optimal, but that a country should tax 
differentially imported goods.  If imported goods differentially consumed by well off, 
such differentiation introduces an element of progressivity.18   
 
Even with WTO restrictions on discrimination against imported goods, it may be possible 
to differentiate tax rates between final goods produced at home and imported final goods 
because they may differ in certain characteristics, e.g. imported goods may, on average, 
be of higher quality (price).  The country can impose a higher excise tax on luxury 
biscuits than on ordinary biscuits; this discrimination may, at the same time, have 
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IV. The design of corruption resistant tax structures   
 
Recent policy discussions have focused on problems of corruption in general, and in tax 
systems in particular.  Interestingly, traditional tax policy discussions have paid little  
attention to corruption.   
 
Corruption takes on many forms, including underreporting incomes by rich taxpayers, 
sometimes with the connivance of government officials; and insisting on bribes not to 
overreport incomes of “honest” tax payers.   
 
Corruption can be viewed as a problem in observability.  That is, if the income could be 
costlessly and objectively observed, then it would presumably be easy to devise 
administrative structures to ensure that every taxpayer paid exactly the amount that he 
should.   
 
Some tax structures provide less opportunity for corruption than others.  Some bases of 
taxation are easier to observe and verify.  Consider, for instance, the window tax imposed 
in medieval England.  The tax was very distortionary—it led to dark homes.  But it had 
one advantage.  It was easy to count the number of windows.  It would be easy to check 
on the collection efforts of any tax official:  a random check would quickly ascertain 
whether he had by and large counted the number of windows correctly.  If a tax official 
tried to charge a tax payer for having too many windows, the aggrieved taxpayer could 
appeal to a court, which could, in turn, verify the number of windows.   
 
In today’s world, there are other bases of taxation which can similarly be (relatively) 
easily verified—the number and size of cars, the square meters of a house.  It may be 
easier to design institutional arrangements for the collection of such taxes without 
corruption  
 
These “reforms” stand in marked contrast to many of the standard approaches to curbing 
corruption, which have often  failed.  For instance, one response to the failure of 
taxpayers to pay what they should has to been to give the government strengthened 
powers of enforcement.  Such policies enable corrupt tax police to extract more money 
from private sector, inhibiting development, without generating much revenue for 
government 
 
Modeling corruption resistant tax structures is beyond the scope of this essay, but centers 
around not just the issue of observability but also verification.  Tax collectors must not 
just “know” the income of the taxpayer, but be able to “prove” it in a judicial proceeding.  
By the same token, those trying to circumscribe corruption among government officials 
must not just “know” that some government official has acted corruptly, but be able to 
verify it before a judicial proceeding.  One must be able to distinguish between “honest” 
errors in judgment, and outright corruption.  There must be some confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial proceeding.  But no judicial proceeding is without error.  There 
have to be penalties, but the penalties must be designed with a recognition that there may 
be errors in judgment.    
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V. Global General Equilibrium Effects 
 
If the V.A.T. . is imposed in all developing countries, it increases output of goods 
produced in informal sector, with global general equilibrium effects—the price of the 
commodities produced in the informal sector falls.  To the extent that there are 
differences between these goods and goods produced in the formal sector, there can 
be global effects on prices.  Many of the goods produced in the informal sector are 
inputs into production processes in the advanced industrial countries, while many of 
the goods produced in the formal sector  are substitutes for goods produced in 
developed countries. To the extent that this is true, at a global scale, the VAT shifts 
the distribution of income/welfare to benefit developed countries at the expense of 
developing countries.   
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VI. Concluding Comments 
 
This essay—and this book—focuses on the many ways in which tax policy in 
developing countries needs to be different from tax policy in developed countries.  
Both the objectives of tax policy, the structures of the economy, and the 
administrative capacities differ.  The essays in this book highlight these differences.   
 
In this paper, we have focused on the V.A.T., in part because it illustrates so well the 
difference between the design of tax policies in developed and less developed 
countries.  For developed countries, the V.A.T.. is efficient, but regressive (or at least 
not progressive).  But, in theory at least, the lack of progressivity made up for by 
progressive income taxes.  In developing countries, typically there is no effective 
income tax to make up for lack of progressivity.  But the V.A.T.  is also not efficient 
and may impede development; and when imposed in all developing countries, may 
have adverse terms of trade effects. 
 
One of the key issues that tax policy for developing countries should focus on is 
promoting development.  Promoting development entails shifting resources into 
sectors with faster economic growth, and more spill-overs.  Every successful country 
has imposed industrial policies.  Under WTO rules, it may be more difficult for 
countries to use tariffs.  This may imply that tax policies will take on increasing 
importance in the design of  industrial policies. 
 
Sometimes it is suggested that it is lack of political will that explains the slowness of 
developing countries to make the tax reforms advised by the IMF—to adopt the 
V.A.T.  Politics does matter; but it may be that the developing countries sense that the 
V.A.T. is neither fair nor efficient, and does not promote their development.  It may 
be that they also recognize that there are other more important tax “reforms”—such 
as taxing the rents of oligopolies and monopolies, which might at the same time 
increase both equity and efficiency.  In most cases, politics helps explain the failure to 
tax these sectors—the vested interests use their resources to influence the political 
process.  It might be well if the international community in general, and the IMF in 
particular, devoted more of its efforts to these tax reforms. 
 
It is not the intention of this book to provide all the answers, and even to provide a 
simple template:  indeed, the tax policy which is appropriate to one developing 
country may differ markedly from that of another.  Rather, our intent is to open up the 
debate on tax policy which has too often been too narrowly circumscribed, with 
developing countries being encouraged to follow a simplistic formula—adopt a 
V.A.T.—and  to enhance understanding of how developing countries have been 




Appendix A.  Proof of the inefficiency of the V.A.T. 
 
      We present a simple, heuristic argument showing why it is in general desirable to 
impose a differential tax on an imported good, used in both sectors, enabling one to lower 
the V.A.T. tax rate applied non-uniformly because of the unobservability of output in the 
informal sector.  The higher input tax serves as an indirect tax on the output of the 
informal sector, which otherwise would have escaped taxation.   
 
 For simplicity, we assume constant returns in the formal sector, and decreasing 
returns (but homotheticity) in the informal sector: 
 Qu = F(Xu, Lu)  
 Qr = G(Xr, Lr) , 
where Qi is the output in the ith sector, Xi is the input of the imported good, and L is 
input of labor.  The dual of the formal sector production function is written 
 
 PQ = Φ (w, pX)  
 
where PQ is the (producer) price of output,  pX is the price of the input, and w is the wage. 
The international price of traded input and output are both assumed to be unity, which 
implies that before taxes 
 1 = Φ (w, 1), 
 
determining the real domestic wage in the formal sector.  If the value added tax is 
imposed to be trade-non distorting, i.e. there is full rebates of the tax for goods which are 
exported, then the above equation still holds.   
 On the other hand, the price facing domestic consumers with a value added tax is 
 
 q = 1 + t 
 
where t is the value added tax.  By assumption, the value added tax is not collected on the 
output of the rural sector, but is imposed on the imported intermediate good that is used 
in its production.  Thus producers in the rural sector maximize 
 qG – wL – x(1+ t) 
so that 
 GX = 1 
 GL  = w/1 + t 
The value added tax thus shifts production towards the informal sector, and distorts the 
input mix in the rural sector towards labor.  It is clearly distortionary.  
 
We now ask, what happens if we add a surtax on imported intermediate goods (fully 
rebated in the formal sector, upon payment of the value added tax) at the rate τ, which 
allows a reduction in the value added tax rate (keeping government revenue constant).  
The revenue raised by the value added tax is equal to the value of the output of the formal 
sector that is not exported.  We assume trade balance, so that exports equal imports.  
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Hence the value added tax revenue is t(F – X).  The net revenue raised by the import duty 
surtax is τXr.  Hence total revenue is 
 R = t(F – X) + τXr, 
And at τ = 0 
 dτ/ dt = - [F – X] (1 – tηC) / Xr 
where 
 ηC is the  (absolute value of the) elasticity of formal sector net output that is not 
exported with respect to the tax rate.  As the value added tax increases, more output shifts 
to the untaxed sector, so that normally we would expect value added tax revenue to be 
reduced. 
 We can assess social welfare by an indirect social welfare function 
 
V = V(q, π(q,(1 + t + τ)), 
 
where π is the rent in the rural sector.  An increase in the surtax on imports allows a 
reduction in the value added tax, which lowers q, which increases welfare.  On the other 
hand, it will normally lower rents in the rural sector.  If we put little weight on the welfare 
of landlords (rents), then it is clear that it is desirable to have a tax on imported inputs.  
But even if we put full weight on the income of landlords, normally a tax on imported 
inputs is desirable: 
 
dV/dt = Vq + Vπ {πq + πPX (1 + dτ/dt)} 
 
 = - VI { F + G – X  - [G – Xr (1 -    [F – X] (1 – tηC) / Xr)]} 




Impact of VAT on Unemployment in Efficiency Wage Model 
 
In this appendix we analyze the impact of a VAT on unemployment, using the 
Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model. 
 
It is easy to derive (using the equilibrium migration constraint and the no shirking 
constraint) that there is a simple relationship between the equilibrium wage and the 
unemployment rate: 
  
 ws = wr(Lu/1- u)) g(h(ws)). 
 
Moreover, since in equilibrium u = h(ws), we have what might be called a generalized no-
shirking constraint, which we simplify as 
 
 ws = ψ (Lu)  
 
 
       On the other hand, the labor demand equation gives 
 
Lu = z(wu) 
 
In equilibrium wu = ws, so the equilibrium (before tax) is given by 
 
 
   w* = ψ (z(w*)) . 
 
The effect of a value added tax (imposed only on the formal sector) is to shift down the 
urban demand curve for labor.   
 
 
Figure 1 shows the standard equilibrium in the urban labor market with a demand 
curve for labor and the “no shirking constraint.”24  In panel A, the rural wage is fixed, 
and the no shirking wage can, accordingly, be drawn as a horizontal line.  The V.A.T.  
has the effect of shifting the demand curve for labor down, lowering urban 
employment, but leaving the wage unchanged.  That means, of course, that the 
unemployment rate is also changed.  The tax simply shifts labor from the formal 
sector to the informal sector.  National output,   
 Q = F(Lu) + wr(N – Lu/1 –u*) 
 
is lower as Lu  is lowered, since (under the hypothesis that the urban rural migration 
equilibrium condition takes the form wr/wu = 1 – u) 
     dQ/ dL u  = [F’ – wr/1 – u*] = tF’ 
17 
where t is the value added tax rate.25  Thus, even though each individual’s labor 
supply is inelastic (so that in a standard model, the VAT, which is equivalent to a tax 
on labor, would have no adverse effect on output) here it clearly does. 
 
    In the case where the rural wage is not fixed, then the value added not only lowers 
the urban wage, but as it drives workers into the rural sector, it lowers the rural wage, 
so much so that the equilibrium unemployment rate actually rises.  Let G(Lr) 
represents rural output, where Nr is rural employment, then  
 




dQ/dt = (∂Q/ ∂Lu)(dLu/ dt)u = u* - wr Lu/(1 – u)2 du/dt  
 
which is even more negative, since not only does labor move from the more 





There may be alternative tax structures with less adverse effects on output and 
welfare.  One obvious candidate is a tax on land, which leaves unaffected all the 
relations described in this model.   
 
Similarly, a tax on imported consumption goods (which are not at the same time 
produced within the country), consumed by the rentier classes, again leaves all the 
relationships unchanged, and thus is non-distortionary.   
 
Taxes on goods consumed by rentiers, but produced within the country, or consumed 
by workers, have more complicated effects.  A tax on imports of a good consumed by 
rentiers, but produced within the country, drives up the price of the domestically 
produced goods, shifting, in effect, the demand curve for labor.  This has exactly the 
opposite effect of a VAT tax, increasing national output and lowering unemployment.   
 
 By contrast, a uniform tax, both on the production and imports of the good, has 
the effect of leaving the demand curve for urban labor unaffected, and thus there is no 
labor reallocation effect,26 except to the extent that the higher price of the good shifts 
demand towards or away from goods produced in the urban sector.  If non-traded 
domestically produced goods are complements of the taxed imported good, then the 
demand curve for urban labor shifts downs, with adverse effects on rural wages, workers’ 
welfare, and unemployment.   
 
                                                 
25
 In equilibrium, the urban wage is equal to the marginal product of labor, after tax, i.e. wu = (1 –t) F’. 
26
 Production of the good occurs to the point where the international price equals the marginal cost of 
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